Strategic Notes on Syria (I): Assad first

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Syria Staffan de Mistura and US Secretary of State John Kerry address news conference following Syria talks in Vienna, 30 October 2015 (US Department of State). Everyone seems to be looking on a different direction in Syria.

Note: the purpose of the Strategic Notes on Syria series is to convey semi-independent thoughts concerning the Syrian civil war and the Islamic State. Given both the magnitude and the dynamism of what is currently happening in Syria, it would be impossible to treat the issue on a single post. Therefore, each note will deal with an specific part of the crisis. Nonetheless, all shall be related as pieces of an strategic approach towards Syria.

The 13 November attacks in and near Paris have created a new sense of urgency amongst Western countries to destroy ISIS once and for all; a sense of urgency that is even higher than during this summer's Refugee crisis (which is still ongoing, by the way). It is this urgency that is forcing Western governments to ask themselves the difficult questions which arise when confronting the extremely difficult reality on the ground in Syria.

The answer to those questions, pressured by outraged public opinions which care much more about terrorist attacks in their homelands than global geopolitics, seem to be that the focus should be on targeting the Islamic State in order to destroy it, meanwhile some political process gets reignited to solve the civil war (it first started in 2012, but failed). However, it is not feasible to destroy ISIS without addressing the situation in Syria (and also Iraq) first.

This is because the Islamic State, or Daesh, cannot be destroyed, but only defeated. In military terms, to destroy means "a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted." Meanwhile, to defeat means "a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use." The distinction between these two concepts is important because ISIS is not simply an army that can be rendered "combat-ineffective", but also the physical representation of a set of ideas that need to be proved wrong so as to disable its will to fight.


It is also extremely important to understand that those ideas are not only related to a distorted view of religious extremism, but some are also political, mainly the lack of representation of the Sunni demographic majorities in the political systems of both Syria and Iraq. Therefore, the support or acquiescence ISIS has gained among local communities can only be defeated through a battle, once more, "for the hearts and minds" of the population.

Therefore, the logical consequence is that political legitimacy cannot be improved through bombing runs. It needs an inclusive and representative political system, as well as physical security for civilians (mainly for Sunnis), both from Daesh's cohercion and from the Assad regime in Syria and radical Shia militias in Iraq that make them look to Daesh with more supportive eyes. So, how to achieve such conditions?

An inclusive political system requires a legitimate political transition

This is one of the main differences between the West and the rebel groups it supports on the ground in Syria: while the former is focused on Daesh, the latter had already been fighting Bashar al Assad's brutal regime for two years before ISIS appeared, and therefore continue to consider it its number one enemy. Despite Daesh's brutality, it is the regime that has killed around 75% of the casualties of the war, it is the regime that is contesting the most populated areas (Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, Idlib...), and it is the regime that has the capacity to bomb almost any position from the air, now with the help of the Russians. So the bottom line is simple: Daesh won't be defeated meanwhile there is no common political project that serves as alternative to it.

Therefore, this common project requires a  legitimate political transition. And it is so complicated to get it right, that most efforts should be put on the diplomatic track. We need to face that Daesh has been present for around two years now, and we are not going to destroy or defeat it in the short term, for a variety of reasons. So, it would be preferable to continue to contain and disrupt the group, meanwhile a serious political process takes center stage which leads, in a few months' time, to a ceasefire and a government of national unity made up of elements of the regime which are not responsible for war crimes and moderate rebel groups (including kurds); and with an established calendar for elections.

This is extremely difficult to achieve, but only a new, legitimate Syrian government can look Syrians in the eye and tell them to embrace peace and reject barbarity.

Physical security requires a legitimate army 

 

So, the second thing that is needed to defeat Daesh is a legitimate army deployed on the ground. Daesh can and should be disruted and contained from the air, but victory will only arrive once the territory it holds is controlled by an efficient army which is considered legitimate by the local population.

Why isn't the air war effective? The air war has actually made a lot to halt the advance of Daesh, mostly in Iraq, because it has limited its freedom of movement. Now, Daesh can no longer move together and mass formations of troops in order to start large-scale attacks on big cities, because those can be easily detected and targeted from above. Many car bombs (or VBIEDs) have been destroyed before they reached their objectives. And the same has happened to static positions, checkpoints, command centers, training camps, logistical hubs; and lately also to oil facilities, to also disrupt the group's finances. All this has put a lot of pressure on the group, and have contributed to the fall of Kobane, Tikrit, Baiji, Sinjar and possibly Ramadi in the near future.

However, all that is not enough to defeat Daesh, because Daesh does not behave as a regular army all the time. On the contrary, ISIS is the prototype of an hybrid force: it fights regularly, as an army, mostly when it is on the offensive, both at the tactical (fire and maneuver, fire support...) and the operational levels ("fixing" the enemy, and through deception operations). However, on the defensive, it becomes an irregular force and a terrorist group. And terrorist groups blend themselves with the civilian population until the very moment the perpetrate an attack; they act covertly. Therefore, they cannot be detected nor targeted from the air.

So, which options are on the table to perform the ground campaign? The first is of course the West: whether NATO, the US or some ad-hoc "coalition of the willing". However, even if they are capable of performing the mission, there are four important downsides which make such a move unlikely: first, there is simply not enough political will to deploy massive ground troops, and even less a year from the US elections. Second, the situation on the ground, and specially the Russian presence. It would be very complicated not to end in a direct confrontation with Russia, given the opposed interests. And third, the operation would be of questionable legality, as Russia would veto any UN Security Council Resolution authorizing ground troops. So, it would be needed to act upon the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, whose legal requirements are fulfilled, but which would require a huge political will that is simply not there. Last, but not least, it would serve Daesh's propaganda, claiming that the "imperialistic armies" have come back to exploit the holy land.

A second option would be to deploy a UN peace-enforcement operation, with Russian explicit or implicit support. In this case, a range of unanswered questions arise: who would it target? Would it be possible to deploy before a political transition is reached? What would it be its geographical mandate? Would it have the means to fulfill the mission?

Therefore, at this point the best option remains for iraqis and syrians themselves to lead the fight, with international support from the air, and also with training, weapons, intelligence, etc. This solution is slower than any other, as it requires a political solution first and takes much longer for unprepared forces to be capable for counter-insurgency operations, but it is the most legitimate and the most sensible solution.

As a conclusion, the end of Assad is needed in order to defeat Daesh.