Our oldest ally

President Barack Obama listents to remarks by President François Hollande during State Arrival Ceremony on the White House, 11 February 2014 (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

"Our oldest ally" is one of those diplomatic idioms which may seem empty, but in reality have a deep meaning. It is a charming way of referring to France by US diplomats, remembering how revolutionary France was the first to support American settlers during the US War of Independence. It has been carefully used whenever relations between the two have been at its highest. As a show of respect and sympathy, this set expression has been used extensively in the aftermath of the 13 November Paris attacks by President Obama (twice), Secretary of Defense Carter and Secretary of State Kerry. However, I would dare to say that this has a truly political meaning too, to the point it may shortly become the "special relationship" of the 21st century.

Next Tuesday 24 of November, French President François Hollande will travel to Washington to meet President Obama. The meeting will be very practical in nature, as both leaders try to figure both a solution to the four and a half year-old Syrian civil war and a more effective grand coallition against ISIS that somehow includes Russia. However, aside from technicalities, such a meeting may represent a level of grand-strategic unity only seen before in the US-UK relationship. That can be considered as the consequence of two distinctive elements.

Division of Labor

 

The first element is a positive one, an increasing alignment of interests between both countries in the last decade, once the violent rupture over the 2003 invasion of Iraq was overcome. It might be argued that this progressive alignment has been the product of a long-term, deliberate effort by both countries, but I would argue to the contrary. The US and France have met in the field: the political, the diplomatic and the military ones; and have strengthened their relationship from the bottom-up. This has been specially acute since early 2013, as Barack Obama breathed again after getting a second term and François Hollande, who had run on an economic campaign, proved to be a strong and reliable actor on foreign policy.

I say that it does not seem to me as a deliberate effort because there have also been friction: former French President Nicolas Sarkozy was much more eager to intervene militarily in Libya in 2011 than most of the Obama administration was, not wanting to be "dragged into your [French and British] shitty war" while retreating from Iraq. Equally, Hollande's fulfilled campaign promise of ending French combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2012 surely was not received warmly at the White House. But on the other hand, France's lightening military action to avoid the fall of Mali to a mix of jihadists and northern separatists first, and efforts to both destroy terrorist networks and underpin state structures in the whole Sahelian region later have not only been widely applauded, but also advanced an interest which is indeed shared with the US at a negligible cost for the latter.

That seems to be the underlying foundation. Despite all imaginable differences, the Franco-US relationship seems overall a relation of equals. It is not expected of France to follow the US wherever it goes, but rather make a division of labor within a common understanding and a set of common values.

For instance, during the EU3+3 nuclear negotiations with Iran, France maintained a particularly strong position, sometimes even more so than Russia. It slowed the process and make the US delegation unhappy. France argued that all it wanted was strict supervision that the agreement was being fulfilled. And despite the fact that, due to the secrecy of the negotiations, it is impossible to know whether that an argument was true, the fact that France, with its strong position, finally agreed to the deal has made it more saleable for both France itself and the US to Israel and the Gulf states.
 

Foreign Ministers Steinmeier of Germany, Sikorski of Poland and Fabius of France on their way to a meeting with Ukrainian President Yanukovych in Kiev on 20 February 2014 (Copyright Phototheck / Trutschel)

Another clear example was the Ukraine crises in 2014. Was the United States involved in handling them at the strategic level? Of course, and has furthermore adopted the role of "reassurer-in-chief" within NATO ever since. But those who walked to and from Kiev's Presidential Administration Building and Independence Square (a.k.a the Maidan) trying to get Yanukovych to cede power peacefully were Germany, France and Poland. And those who spend the night of 11 February 2015 negotiating with Presidents Putin of Russia and Poroshenko of Ukraine plus the rebel leaders of the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Lugansk in order to agree to a "Minsk II" agreement that led to a ceasefire after violence re-erupted in eastern Ukraine early 2015 were France and Germany, the members of the so-called "Normandy Format".

That, in turn, poses two interesting points. The first one is that the absence of the United States from such negotiations is not at all the consequence of lack of interest on the issue. John Kerry could have very well started another round of frantic, world-saving shuttle diplomacy, but the point is that he needn't do it because Europeans were not only ready to take the lead but indeed better positioned to tackle the issue.

The second point is the confirmation that France has become Europe's leader in security affairs. Germany may have more economic power and leverage within the EU institutions, but France has the more authority as things get uglier. Germany has played an impressive role on Ukraine, but only because it was dealt with from a diplomatic viewpoint. Both the German society and its political elite are unwilling to change its opposition for the use of the military instrument. But what about the United Kingdom?

The decline of the "Special Relationship" 

 

I was taught that "there can only be one special relationship" between the United States and an European country. So, arguing that "our oldest ally" is to substitute the "Special relationship" does not only mean a very close Franco-US relationship, but also that the role of the United Kingdom is dwindling.

The UK is in an age of dissonance. Despite some cuts, it has one of Europe's finest militaries, and it is furthermore building two brand-new aircraft carriers paired with F35s and will presumably start building a new class of ballistic missile submarines next year. But at the same time, this apparent effort for maintaining a solid global reach is being matched at the political level with what seems a deliberate effort to withdraw from most of what it has been cornerstone to since the end of the Second World War. It is understandable that the UK does not want to renounce to the pound sterling given the global clout of the City. But it does not seem understandable nor logical that the very country that gave the world Magna Carta threatens to withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights. Something very similar happens with the European Union membership. Many in the United Kingdom say they want sovereignty back, and that is a legitimate demand. But one must remember that the necessary consequence for regaining national sovereignty is losing considerable influence in Europe.

Furthermore, there is also the perception that the UK is putting a premium on short-term trade gains in exchange for long-term political alliances. The UK was among the first to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank despite US pressures against such a move. But moreover, recent state visits to London by Chinese and Indian Presidents Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, which were pompous and smooth despite Human Rights abuses and tensions in the South China Sea, point in this direction.

That might be the perception in Washington. Proof may be the warning it recently made that in case of a Brexit, the US would still prioritize a collective free trade agreement with the EU, TTIP, over a bilateral one with the UK. What we see here is both a sense of pragmatism and bewilderment. Pragmatism because an alliance of first magnitude cannot remain sustainable if one of the allies is not willing to confront the challenges the alliance is due to meet. And bewilderment because it seems the US, as well as many in the Continent (myself included) cannot believe how the UK can put its whole global standing at risk for what seems a matter of internal politics.

It is thus solely up to the United Kingdom to remain up to its historical status.

Turning tables

 

But make no mistake. Whether the United Kingdom leaves or stays in the European Union, the damage is already done. Even much before Prime Minister David Cameron ran last spring on a campaign based on a Brexit referendum, the UK has, for some time, already been behaving in kind: refusing engagement and commitment, lacking initiative.

So, the sense one gets is that behind the crises (Ukraine, Syria, refugees, the Euro), we are in front of a progressive role swap at the heart of Europe. France has lost its anti-Americanism and a little of its pursuit for geopolitical independence at all cost at the exchange of a voice that in some issues counts second only to the US one. The United Kingdom has partly lost such a voice in exchange for allowing to worry less about what happens beyond the English channel.

Repercussions will be outstanding. To start with, the United States and France seem ready to smooth their positions so as to reach without further delay an agreement with Russia on a political transition in Syria with or without Assad that allows to focus efforts on defeating ISIS. And in that process, France's middleman role may prove essential. But that is already another story.